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[1) This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer ~f
 informati~xi relat-
ing to the representation of ~ client curing the
 lawyer's representation of
the client. See RLxle 1.18 for the lawyer's dut
ies with respect to informa-
~ion provided to the lawyer by a prospective c
lient, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the
lawyer's duty not to reveal inforrrialiorl relat
ing to the lawyer's prior rep-
resentation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) an
d 1.9(c)(1) for the law-
yer's duties with respect to the use of such in£
orznation to the disadvan-
tage of clients and former clients.
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[2] A £und~inental principle i~1 the client-lawyer relationship is that,
in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not re-
veal information relati~lg to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the
definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the
hallmark of the client-lawyer relltionship. The client is thereby encour-
aged to seek legal assistance and to commuiucate fi111y and frankly with
the lawyer even as to embarrassing ox 1eg111y damaging subject matter.
The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and,
if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost
without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their
rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be
legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all
clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by
related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product
doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professio~zal eth-
ics. The atforney-client privilege and work product doctrine 1pply in ju-
dicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a wit-
ness or otherwise requixed to proc~~.ice evidence concerning a client. The
rule of client-1lwyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.
The confidentiality rule, fox example, applies not only to mltters commu-
nicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to
the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such
information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relat-
ing to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to dis-
closures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected informa-
tion but corxid reasonably lead to the discovery of sL1ch information by a
third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to
the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likeli-
hood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or
the situation involved.
14uthorize~ Disclos~Ye
[5) Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special cir-
cumstances limit thlt authority, a lawyer is impliedly aLtthorized to make
disclosures abo~lt ~ client ti=hen appropriate in carrying out the represen-
27
4
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 9 [2014], Art. 32
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/32
wile ~.6 A~A,1~OL3~L IZLTZES
tation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly atx-
thorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to mike a
disclosure that Eacilit~tes ~ satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers
in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other
information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed
Shat particular information be confined to specified 1lwyers.
I~iscdosu~^e A~ve~se to ~l~ent
[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by z strict rule
requiring lawyexs to preserve the confidentiality of information relating
to the repxesentation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to
limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of
life and physical integrity and. permits cliscl.osL~re reasonably necessary to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily haxm. Such harm
is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered .imminently or if there
is a present anal substantill threat that a person wi11 suffer such harm at
a latex date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the
threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally dis-
charged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this informa-
tion to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a per-
son who drinks the water will contract alife-threatening or debilitatuZg
disease end the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or
reduce the member of victims.
[7] Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidenti~l-
ity that permits the lawyer. to reveal znfoxmation to ~11e extent necessary
to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or prop-
erty interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used
or is using the lawyer's services. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer
relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client
can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful
conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal
the client's misconduct, the lawyex may not counsel or assist the cfient in
conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See
also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw
fxozn the representation of the client in such circumstances, anti Rule
1.13(c), which permits the 1lwyer, where the client is an organization, to
reveal infornlatiol~ relating to t1~e rep7~esenlalion ii1 lunilea ci~•cui7lstailce~.
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[8] Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which. the lawyer does
not learzz of the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consum-
mated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclo-
sure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there wi.il be situations in
which the loss sufferer{ by the affected person can be prevented, rectified
or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information re-
lating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected
persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to
recoup their losses. Plragraph (b)(3) does not apply when a person who
has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for represen-
tation concerning that offense.
[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer
from. securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal xe-
sponsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing
information to secure such advice will be impliedly a~.rthorized for the
lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not
impliedly authorized, parlgraph (b)(4) perm.its such disclosure because
of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
[10] Where a legal claim or. disciplinary charge alleges complicity of
the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involy-
ing representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary tc~ estlblish a defense. The same is
true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of
a former client. Such a charge can arise_ in a civil, criminal, disciplinary
or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed
by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person,
for example, a. person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer
and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an
assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not
require the lawyer. to await the commencement of an action or proceed-
ing that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established
by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion.
the right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been
commenced.
[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to
prove the services rendered it1 an action to collect it. This aspect o£ the
rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship
may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.
29
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~JL~S
[12] Other 1a~w may require that a lzwyer dis
close information about
~ client. Whether such 1 law supersedes 
Rule 1.6 is ~ question of law
beyond the scope o£ these Rules. When
 disclosure of information relat-
ing to the representation appears to be re
quired by othex law, the lawyer
must discuss the matter with the client to th
e extent required by Rule 1.~.
If, however, the other law supersedes this Ru
le and requires disclosure,
paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer tv m~l<e suc
h disclosures as ire nec-
essary to comply with the law.
Detectio~a of C'o~a~la~ts ~~'~~at~~est
[:13] Paragraph (b)(7) recognizes that lawyers in
 different firms may
need to disclose limited information to eac
h other to detect end resolve
conflicts of interest, such ~s when a lawy
er is considering an association
with another firm, t~vo or more firms Ire 
considering a merger, or a law-
yer is considering the purchase of a law pr
actice, See Rule 1.17, Comment
[7]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and l
aw firms are permitted to
disclose limited information, but only on
ce substantive discussions re-
garding the new relationship have occurred
. Any such disclosure should
ordinarily include no more than the ident
ity of the persons and entities
involved in a matter, a brief summery of the
 general issues involved, and
infoxmation aboLrt whether the matter has 
terminated. Even this limited
information, however, should be disclose
d only to the extent reasonably
necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of 
interest that might arise from
the possible new relationship. Moreover,
 the disclosuxe of any inform~-
tion i~ prohibited if it would compromise
 the attorney-client privilege ox
otherwise prejudice the client (e. g., the fact that a corp
orate client is seek-
ing advice on a coxpoxate takeover that has 
not been publicly annoLznced;
that a person has consulted a lawyer abo
ut the possibility of divorce be-
fore the person s intentions are known to t
he person's spouse; or that ~
person has consulted a lawyer about a crimi
nal investigation That has not
led to a public charge). Under those circumstanc
es, p~ragr~ph (a) prohib-
its disclosure unless the client or former cli
ent gives informed consent. A
lawyer's fiduciary dLrty to the lawyer's fi
rm may also govern a lawyer's
conduct when exploring an association with 
another fixm and is beyond
the scope of these Rriles.
[14] Any information disclosed pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(7) may
be used or further disclosed only to the ext
ent necessary to detect and
resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b){7) d
oes not restrict the use of
information ace~uired by means indepencl
Pnt of any disclosure pursu-
3U
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ant to paragraph (b)(7). Paragraph (b)(7) also does not effect the disclo-
sLzre of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise
authorized, see Comment [5], such as when 1 lawyer in a firm discloses
information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect anti resolve con-
flicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new
representation.
[15] A Dwyer may be ordered to revel information relating to the
representation of a client by a court or by another trib~inal or governmen-
tal entity claiming authority pw-suant to other l.aw to compel the disclo-
sure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyex
should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order
is not authorized by other law or that the infoxmation sought is protected
against disclosure by the lttoxney-cliezzt privilege or other applicable law.
In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client
about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by RLile 1.4. Unless
review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to com-
ply with the court's order.
[1b] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure anly to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the
purposes specified.. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to
pers~lade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclo-
sure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be
no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish
the puxpose. If the disclosure will be m1d~ in coruzection with a judicial
proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access
to the information to the tribunal ox other persons having a need to know
it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be
sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
[17] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of in-
formation relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes
specified in paragraphs (b)(2) thro~,tgh (b)(6). In exercising the discretion
conferred by this Rule, the Dwyer may consider such factors as the nafiire
of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be
injured by the clieizt, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction
and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A 1lwyer's deci-
sion not to disclose as permitted. by paragraph (b) does not violate this
R~.ile. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some RLtles
require disclosure only if s~.ich disclosure would be permitted by parl-
graph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3. Pule 3.3, on the other h1nd,
31
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requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of 
whether such
disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See IZu1e 3.3(c).
Acti~~ ~~r~e~e~ea~~ly t€~ P~~~e~v~ Coa~~~ea~~ec~li~~
[18] Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safegL
~~rd
information relating to the representation of a client against 
unauthor-
ized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unaLrth
orized dis-
closLrre by the Lawyer or ether persons who are participlting i
n the rep-
resentation of the client or who are s~.zbject to the lawyer's sLxpervision.
See Rules 1.1, 5.1 end 5.3. The ~inauthorized access to, or 
the inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure oF, information relating to the
 representation
of a client does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the
 lawyer
has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access ox disclo
sure. Factors to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the law
yer's efforts
incl~,~de, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the informat
ion, the like-
lihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employe
d, the cost of
employing additional safeguards, the diflic~.ilty of implement
ing the safe-
guards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely 
affect the law-
yer's ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or im
portant
piece of software excessively difficult to use). A client may requir
e the
lawyer to implement special security measures not req~ur
ed by this Rule
or may give informed consent to forgo security measures tha
t would oth-
erwise be required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be
 required to
take additional steps to safegulyd a client's information in o
rder to com-
ply with other law, such as state and federal laws thlt govern
 data pri-
vacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of
, or unau-
thorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scop
e of these
Rules. For a lawyer's dirties when sharing information with no
nlawyers
outside the lawyer's own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments [3]-[4].
[19] When transmitting a communication that includes information
relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take r
easonable
precautions to prevent the information from coming into the 
hands of tu-t-
intended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that t
he 1lwyer
arse special security measures if the method of communiclti
on affords a
reasonable expectation of pri~Tacy. Special circumstances, howe
ver, znay
warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determ
ining the
reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality includ
e the
sensitivity of the information Ind the extent to which the priv
acy of the
commLlnication is protected by law or by a confidentiality a
greement.
32
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A client may require t11e Dwyer to implement special security measures
not required by this Rule or may gi-ve informed consent to the use of ~
means of commL~X~ication that woLzld otherwise be prohibited by this
Rule. Whether a lawyer may be rec~uixed to tale additional steps in order
to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data
privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.
~'oa~nze~ ~laent
[20] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer rela-
tionship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the pro-
hibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former
client.
De£~~aa~~~~a~ C~~~sm~def~~~~~e~
"Fraud" See Rule 1.0(d)
"Informed consent" See Rule 1.0(e)
"Reasonable" and "Reasonably" See Rule 1.0(h)
"Reasonably believes" See Rule 1.0(i)
"Substantial" See Rule 1.0(1)
33
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t~a~ 1~~~~~ era t~~ sa~a~ li~agata~~ cs~ ~tIl~e~ ~~~cee~~rag ~e~ox~e
a t~~~ tonal; ~aa~
~4~ ~ac~n a~~~s~~~ cYie~a~ ;f~~s ~1a~~arrne~ co~se~a~, sor~f~~raaed
~aa vvri~~~n,
~~~~~
~e~~Y~d ~Y~~aci~l~s
[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the
lawyer's relationship to 1 client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise
from the lawyer's responsibilities to anotlZer client, a foxmer client or a
third person ox from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules re-
garding certain concurrent conflicts o£ interest, see Rule 1.8. Fox former
client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of intexest involving
prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. ~"ox definitions of "info:rmed consent"
and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b).
[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule re-
quixes the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine
whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation
may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the
conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under
paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing.
The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients re-
ferred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose represen-
tation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).
[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is Luzder-
taken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the
lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions
of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, ~ law-
yer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and
type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litiga-
tion matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rile
5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedti~res will not ex-
cL~se a lawyex's violation of this Rule. As to whether aclient-lawyer rela-
tioilship exists or, having once been established, is continlzing, see Com-
ment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the
lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the
lawyer his obtained the informed consent of the client under the condi-
tions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is in-
34
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C~,IENT-~A~1`YEIZ ~ZEI.~'~IOIat~I-~I~ Rule 1.7
volved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients
is determined both by the lawyer's lbility to comply with duties owed to
the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the
remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client.
See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].
[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and
other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of par-
ties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as
when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by
another client represented by the lawyer in alp unrelated matter. Depend-
ing on t11e circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw
from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer
must seek court approval where necessary end take steps to minimize
harm to t11e clients. See Rule 1."16. The lawyer must continue to protect
the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has
withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).
Identifying- C'~nfCicts of Intea^este
I)i~ectly fl dve~se
[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation
directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consenf.
Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one mat-
ter agaizzst a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even
when the matters are wholly unrelated. Tl1e client as to whom the rep-
resentation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the res~xlting
damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's
ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on ~~hose
behalf the adverse representation is L~tdertaken reasonably may fear that
the lawyer wi11 pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference
to the other client, i.e., t11at the representation may be materially limited
by the lawyer's interest in. retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly
adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a
client who appears a.s a witness in a lawsurt involving another client, as
when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in
the l.awsu.it. On the other hand, simtlltanec~us represezltation in unrelated
matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as
representation of competing economic e~lterprises in unrelated litigation,
does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not re-
quire consent of the respective clients.
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[7] Directly adverse conflicts can ~Iso arise in transactional maters.
For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in
negotiations with a bLryer represented by the lawyer, not in the same
transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not under-
take the representation without the informed consent of each client.
Identifying Conflicts of I~t~~^~st:
1~c~teria l I.inzi tatio~e
[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest
exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, rec-
ommencl or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will
be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or
interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals
seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited. in the
lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that
'~; each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the other
s. The
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available
to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself re-
quire disclosure and consent. The cxitical questions are the likelihood that
a difference in interests will eventuate end, if it does, whethex it will ma-
terially interfere with the lawyer's indepezldent professional judgment
in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably
should be pLirsued on behalf of the client.
Lawyer's Responsibilities to
Fo~ner Clients and Other "~"hird Persons
[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's du-
ties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsi-
bilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities
to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from ~ lawyer's service
as a txuslee, executor or corporate director.
Personal InteYest Conflicts
[10] The 1lwyer's own interests shoLlld not be permitted to have an
adverse effect on xepresentation of a client. For example, if the probity
of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may
be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.
Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employ-
ment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm repre-
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senting t11e opponent, such discussions could materially limit the law-
yer's representation of the client. In addition., a lawyer may not allow
related business interests to affect representation, for example, by refer-
ring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed. fi-
nancial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of
personal interest conflicts, including business transactions wit11 clients.
See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts unc-ler Rule 1.7 ordinarily
Ire not impLrted to other lawyers in a law firm).
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter
or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or mar-
riage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be re-
vealed and that the lawyer's flmily relationship will interfere with both
loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client
is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship
between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the represen-
tation. Thus, a lawye~~ related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child; sib-
ling or spouse, ordinarily znay not represent a client in a matter where
that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives in-
formed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relation-
ship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with
whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.
[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships
with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the
client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).
I~te~est o~I~~YSOYI P~iJ2Yl~~DY Gt L~Z472~~Y~S S~Y77~~~
[13] A Dwyer may be paid from a source other than the client, in-
cluding 1 co-client, i.f the client is informed of that .fact and consents and
the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer "s duty of loyalty or
independent jL~dgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the
payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the law-
yer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the law-
yer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee
or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then
the Dwyer must comply Frith the requ.iremen~s of paragraph (b) before
accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict
is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about
the material. risks of the representation.
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~4~1~ I1itOY7~~ 12~J~,~S
I'~c~hibits~ IZe~~es~~ctr ta
ns
[l4] Orciinaxily, clients may
 consent to repxesent
~tion not~vithstanci-
ing ~ conflict. However,
 as inc~icatecl in paragrz
ph (b), some conflicts ire
nonconsentable, meaning
 that the lawyer invalv
ed cannot properly aslt
£or such agreement ox p
rovide representation on
 the b<zsis of the client's
consent. When. the Dwye
r is representing more 
than o~ie dzezlt, the ques-
tion of consent~bility m
ust be resolved as to eac
h client.
(15] Consentability zs ty
pically determa.ned by co
nsidering whether
the interests of the clien
ts will be adequltely p
rotected if the clients ar
e
permitted to give their 
informed consent fio rep
resentation burdened by
a conflict of interest. Thu
s, undex paragraph (b)(
1}, represenfiation is pro-
hibited if in the circum
stances the lawyer ca
nnot reasonably conclud
e
that the lawyer wild be a
ble ~to provide compet
ent and diligent re~pxesen
-
tation. See Rule 1."I (compe
tence) end Rule 7.3 (dili
gence}.
[16] Paragraph {b)(2) desc
ribes conflicts fihat are
 nonconsentable be-
c~use the repxesentatio
n is pxohibited by appli
cable law. For example, z
n
some states substantive
 law provides that the s
ame lawyer may not rep
-
resent more than one 
defendant in a capital c
ase, even with the cons
ent
of the clients, and undex
 federal criminal statut
es certain representatio
ns
by ~ former government
 Iawyex are prohibited, 
despite the informed co
n-
sent of the former client
. In addition, decisional
 law in same states limits
the ability of a governzne
i~tal client, such as a 
municipality, to consent
 to
a conflict of iziterest.
j17] Paragraph (b)(3) describe
s conflicts that are nonc
onsentable be-
cause ~f the institution
al interest in vigorous
 development of each c
Ii-
ent's position when th
e clients ire aligned dir
ectly against each other 
in
the same litigation ox o
ther proceeding before ~
 tribunal. Whether client
s
are aligned directly aga
inst each other within t
he meaning of this para
-
grapl~ requires exazniri
ation of the context of t
he pxoceeding. Althoug
h
this paragraph does no
t preclude a ll~vyer's mu
ltiple representation of
adverse parties to a med
iation (becaL~se mediatio
n is not a proceeding
before a "tribztnai" unde
r Rule 1.0(m)), such repre
sentation may be pre-
cluded by p~ragra~h (b)(1
).
i
i Inf~~c~ C'oz~~
ez~t
a [18] Info~
mecl consent requires g
hat each affected client b
e aware of
the relevant circLxmstan
ces and of the materia
l and reasonably foresee
-
able ways that the conf
lict could have adverse
 effects on the interests 
of
that client. See ~Zule 1.0
(e) (informed consent). The
 information xec~uixed
~j
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depends on the nature of the conflict and th.e nature of the risks involved.
1Nhen representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken,
the information must include the implications of the common representa-
tion, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality anal the attor-
ney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved.. See Com-
ments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).
[19] Under some circumstances it maybe impossible to make the dis-
closure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer repre-
sents different clients in related matters a11d one of the clients refuses to
consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.
i~1 some uses the alternative to common representation can be that each
party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of
incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of secur-
ing separate representatiozl, are factors that may be considered by the
affected client in determining whether common representation is in the
client's interests.
~'onsent ConfaYvwced an ~aT~iting
[20) Paragraph (b) requires the lawyex to obtain the informed consent
of the client, confirmed in wrifiing. Such a writing may consist of a docu-
ment executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and
transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also
Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible
to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed
consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable
time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not
sLrpplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to
explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with
a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to
afford the client a reasonable oppartunity to consider the risks and al-
ternatives and to raise questions a~zd concerns. Rather, the writing is re-
gLlired in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the
client is being asked to make arzd to avoid disputes ox ambiguities that
might later occur in the absence of a writing.
IZevo~Cing Consent
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the con-
sen.t and., like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation
39
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Pa~A IVI~'~~;~ 5;s~ i,~,
o
~t any time. Whether re
vol<xng consent to th
e client's own represen
tation
precludes the lawyer f
rom contzn~iing to rep
resent other ctients de
pends
on the circt~msta~~ces, ir
~.clL~ding the nature of
 the cont7ict, whether 
the cli-
ent revoked consent be
cause of a mafierial ch
ange in circL2r~stances
, the
reasonable expectation
s of the other clients 
anct whether material
 detxi-
ment to the other clien
ts or the lawyer. would
 result.
C'c~ns~aat try 1F~~~aa^~ 
C'~a~~lac~~
[22J Whether a lawyer m
ay properly request
 a client to waive con
-
flicts that might arise
 in the future is subject to 
the test o~ paragraph
 (b).
The effectiveness of su
ch waivers zs general
ty determined by the
 extent
to which the client r
easonably Understand
s the material asks 
that the
waiver entails. The mo
re comprehensive the
 explanation of the ty
pes of
future representation
s that might arise a
nd the actL~al and re
asonably
foreseeable adverse 
consegr~~ences of tho
se representations, th
e greater
the Iil<elihood that the
 client will have the re
c~ziisite understandin
g. ThLzs,
if the client agrees to 
consent to ~ particula
r tyke of conflict with
 which
the client is already fa
miliar, then the conse
nt ordin.~zily will be ef
fec~ive
with regard to that t
ype of conflict. If the 
consent is general and
 open-
endect, then the cons
ent ordinarily wzll be 
ineffective, because zt
 is not
reasonably likely Shat 
the client will have l~
nderstood the material
 risks
irtvolve~~. On the othe
r hazZd, if the client i
s an experienced user
 of the
Iegal servzces invotv
ed andzs reasonably
 informed regarding t
he risk
ghat a conflict may aris
e, Such consent zs mo
re likely ~to be effectiv
e, pax-
ticizlarly if, e.g., the cl
ient is independently r
epresented by other co
unsel
in giving consent anti t
he consent is limited ~
o future conflicts unre
lated
to tk~e subject of. the repres
entation. In any case,
 advance consent cann
ot
be effective if the circ
umstances that material
ize in the fut~ire are su
ch as
woLtld mike the confli
ct nonconsentable tind
er paragraph {b).
~'~~j~l~cts z~c I.2ta~c~ti~aa
j23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohib
its representation of 
opposing parties in
the same litigation, reg
ardless of tie clients' 
consent. On the other
 hand,
simultaneous represen
tation of parties whos
e interests zn litigation
 may
conflict, such as coplaic
rtiffs ar codefendants
, is governed by parag
raph
(a)(2). A conflict play ex
ist Uy reason of subst
antial ciiscrepaz~cy in t
ree
parties' testimony, inc
ompatibility in positio
ns in relation to an opp
osing
party o:r the fact that
 there ire substantially
 different possibilities 
of set-
tlement of the claims o
r Iiabila:ties in question
. Such conflicts can ari
se in
40
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criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interesf in rep-resenting multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarilya lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On tlZeother hind, common representation of persons having similar interests incivil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent Legal positions in dif-ferent tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The merefact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might createprecedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the 1lwyerin an unrelated mattex does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict ofintexest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ac-tion on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effective-ness in representing another. client in a different case; for example, whena decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriouslyweaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevantin determining whether the clients need to be advised o£ the risk include:where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive. or proce-dural, th.e temporal relationship between the matters, the significance ofthe issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involvedand the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If thexeis significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent ofthe affected clients, the lawyer mast refuse one of the representations orwithdraw from o71e or both matters.
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plain-tiffs or defendants in aclass-action lawsuit, unnamed members of theclass are ordinarily not considered to be dzents of the lawyer for pur-poses of 1pplying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer doesnot typically need to get the consent of such a person before representinga client suing the person in an unrelated. hatter.. Similarly, a lawyer seek-ing to represent an opponent in a class action sloes not typically need theconsent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lativyer representsin an unrelated matter.
IVonlitig~ztion Conflicts
[26] Conflicts of interest Lrnder paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise incontexts other than litigation. Fox• a discussion of directly adverse con-flicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevint factors in de-termining whether there is significant potential for material limitationinclude the dLtration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationshzp with the
41
19
Gaal: Handout 1: Ethics in Higher Education
Published by The Keep, 2014
~Zule ~.7 AAA i~/dOD~I. RiJi,ES
client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the Dwyer,
the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the
client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and de-
gree. See Corrunent [8].
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning
and estate administration. ~ lawyex may be called upon to prepare wills
fox several family members, such as husband and wife, anti, depending
upon the circtamstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate
~dzninistration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of
a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fidtilciaxy; tu-tder
another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In
order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make
clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.
(28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances.
For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation
whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but com-
mon representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned
in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them.
Thus, a lawyer may seek to eskablish or adjust a relationship between cli-
ents on ~n amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in
helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepre-
neurs, working oL~t the financial reorganization of 1n enterprise in which
two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution
in settlement.of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse
interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each
party might have to obtain separlte representation, with the possibility
of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these
and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for
all of them.
Special ~on~zderc~~zo~as in Co~ec~aaa~t IZep~esentc~tioaa
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same
matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation
fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the re-
sult can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily,
the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients
if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure
is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For exam-
ple, alawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where
42
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contentious litigation ox negotiations between them are imminent or con-te>.mplated. Moreover, because t11e lawyer i.s required to be impartial be-4 tween commonly represented clients, representation of m~lltiple clieT.lts isimproper when it is unlikely that iinp~rtiality can be maintained. Gener-ally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antago-niszn, the possibility that the clients` izlterests can be adequately servedby common representation is not vezy good. C3ther relevazlt factors arewhether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a con-ti~luing basis and whet~ei the situation involves creating or terminating arelationship between the parties.
[30] A particularly important factor in detexmining the appropxiate-ness of common representation is the effect o~1 client-lawyer confidenti-ality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client~z~ivilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly representedclients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that iflitigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protectany such communications, and the clients should be so advised.[31) As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representa-tion will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer notto disclose to the other client information relevazzt to tk~e common repre-sentation. Tizis is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty toeach client, and each client has khe right to be informed of anything bear-ing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and theright to expect thlt the lawyer will use that information to that client'sbenefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common rep-resentation and a.s part of the process of obtaining each client`s informedconsent, advise each client that information will be shared and that thelawyer wi11 have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter zna-terial to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited cir-cuznstances, it ma.y be appropriate .far the lawyer to proceed with the rep-resentation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed,that the lawyer will keep cez~tain information confidential. For example,the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client'strade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation in-volving ajoint venture between the clients and agree to keep t1~at infor-mation confidential with fihe informed consent of both clients.[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between cli-ents, the lawyer should. make clear that the iawye~-'s role is not that ofpartisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that
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the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions
than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the
scope of the representation made necessary as a result o£ the common
representation should be fully explained to the clients at the o~~tset o.f the
representltion. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common rep-
resentation has the right to loyal and diligent representation end the pro-
tection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligatS.ons to a former client. The client
also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
O~gc~niz~xta~n~l Client
[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization
does not, by virtL~e of that representation, necessarily represent any con-
stituent or affiliated organizltion, such as ~ parent or subsidiary. See R~~le
1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer fox 1n organization is not barred from accepting
representation adverse to an affiliate in an unxelated matter, unless the
circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a cli-
ent of the 1a~vyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the
organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to
the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organiza-
tional client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's
representation of the other client.
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other orglniz~tion who is also ~
member of its board of directors should detexmine whether the respon-
sibilities of the two roles may conflict. 'The Dwyer may be called on to
advise the corporation in maters involving actions of the directors. Con-
sic~eration should be given to the frequency with which such situations
may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's
resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtain-
ing legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is mate-
rial risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence
of professional judgment, the lawyer should. not serve as a clixector or
should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest
arise. The lawyer should advise the othex members of the board that in
some circumstances mattexs discussed at board meetings while the law-
yer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the
attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might
require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require th.e lawyer and
the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.
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"Confirmed in writing" See Rule 1.0(b)
"Informed consent" See .Rule 1.0(e)
"Reasonably believes" See Rule 1.0(i)
"Tribuzzal" See Rule 1.0(m)
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~~~v ~ ~o~o ~~~~~..~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~o
~~~ A ~aver~r~~ ~~~~~ ~~~ e~~~~ a~~~ ~ ~a~s~~e~s t~~aa~~c~a~ra ~~~~a
,~ s~~~~nt ~~ ~~amv~r~~a~l~ ~sq~.flIl~~: ~~ ~~vxae~~$aag , p~~s~~s~~ry sec~x~ax~y
~o~ ~#~e~ ~eea~~a~~~gi i~~~res~ ~s~~r~ss~ t~ ~ c~ae~at ~~~esse
~~) ~1~~ t~a~s,~c~~~~ a~~ tea~s~~ ~~ ~~a~c~ tie la~ivye~ acq~a~~e~
~~~ ~~t~~e~~ ax~~ ~a~r ,~~~ re~5~~a~b~e #~ tae c~~e~~ and ~~e faa~l~
~a~c~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~aa~~~~i ~r~ ~rv~~~i~g a~a a ~aa~xae~ ~~aat c~~ be
~~~s~~a~~~~r ~a~~~r~~~o~ ~~ t~~: c13e~at,
~~'~ t~~ ~~~e~~ a~ ~~w~~e~ ~~ ww~a~~~b ~~ ~~ae ~~sz:~~~~lgfry o~
~eeki~g ~~a~ ~~ ~~~e~n ~ ~~~~o~aa~ye o~~~~~~a~ipty ~~ s~e~ ~~e
~~v~ce ~~ i~~ep~~~a~r~f ~a~g~~ ~~~n~e~ a~n ~h~ ~~~~sa~f~~~r ~~d
~3~ ~~a~ sl~e~~ g~-v~.~ a~~~~~a~~ ~~~seaa~, z~a a ~nr~z~~~~ ~ig~ea~
~~ ~~e slie~~, ~~ g~ae e~se~t~a~ ~erm~ ~~ ~~e f~a~as~ct~~~ ~~ad ~~e
~~~v-ye~'s ~~~~ a~a ~~ne ~~a~sac~~~~, g~~~~~~~g ~rla~~~er she ~~~~~
~~ ~~~ge~e~a~aa~ il~e ~~g~~a~ ~~ ~a~ ~~,~a~~aefi~~.
~~~ ~ Ilav~rye~ ~~~~i ~~~ x~s~ a~i~~s~~~~~~ ~e~~~~~~ ~~
~ep~ese~~a~`~~~e ~~ a ~~~e~~ ~~ t~~ ~~~a~g~~a~tage ~~ ~F~e ~s~ae~a~ ~~a~~~~
~~e e~i~~s ga~~:~ ~~af~~~~ e~~s~:~~y ~~.~~~~ dS ~(21'~@y'i'~k'S~ ~d' $'~'~fl$~Y'P_S~
~~~ ~ ~a~ivz~~~ ~~a~~ aa~a~ ~~~~~a~ a~ay sa~~a~fa~f~~R ba~~ ~~~ a ~~~e~s,
a~c~~~~s~~ a ~~~~,~~ae~a~ary gasp, ~~ ~~~~v~~~ ens ~e$aa~~ ~~ ~ ~~~Q~g ~~
g~~t~a~a~~~ b~ar~~~ ~~t~ ~~~i~eg ~~ ~ ~e~~~~ ~e~~te~ ~~ ~~e ~~~rg~e~
~a~~ ~~i~~~~~~a~~ ~a~~ a~~a~e~~ ~~.e ~~~v-~ye~ ~~ ~€~a~r ~e~c~p~e~~ ~f ~~ne
~~~~ as ~r~~~~~:s~ ~~ t~~ e~~ea~~, ~'~~ ~~~~~~e~ o~ ~~~~ pa~~~~~~~, ~~~~~~~
~~~s~ra~~ ~~c~~c~~ ~ s~~~a~~, e~~~~, ~~~a~s~e~~~~, pauzr~~, g~a~~~~;c~~~
~~' ~a~P~ea~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~d~w~~~a~ vs»~~ ~ar~~~a ~~~ $a~i~a~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~
~~a~~a~~~ ~ ~fl~a~e, ~a~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~es~~~,
~~~ ~~p~~ ~~ i~~ s~~c~a~s~~~a ~~ ~~~~~sea~~~~i~~ ~£ ~ s~~~~~,
~ ~~~r~~ ~~~~~ ~aor ~nu~'~~ ~~c ~~~~~a~~e a~ ~~~~~~~a~ gav~~~ ~~~
~~~r~~rr ~~&~:~~~y ~r ~~~~~ ri~~~~ ~~ ~ ~~x~~~y~~ ~~ ~~~~~~a~ ~~se~
~~ s~~s~~~~c~~& ~~~~ ~~a a~a~~~;r~a~~a~+~ ~~~~~n~~ ~a ~~u~ r~~~~~e~a3~~a~eue
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~2aa~e 1.8 A~~ ~~~~~. 1Z~T3.~~
~~~~  
iav~ry~~ sha~fl rac~t ~rovaaic; firaans~al assystazase to a
~~~~~~~~~n ~o~~~~~i~~e ~rt~ ~~a~~~a~~ ar co~atena~~ate~ ti#iba#i~~c,
excel# t~ata
{~.~ a la~vye~ a~ a~va~nc~ eoanrt cysts ~~ci exp~ereses of
~~~ag~t~~~a, ~h~ rep~gr~a~cera~ of ~k~i~~e ~~ ~e so~tg~ag~~t oar
~~e ~aat~oa~~ o~ tl~e rra~~ter, ~~d
~~9 a ~a~~r r~~s~es~:~t~~~ a~ ~~a~d~~erat slient may ~~y coax~t
~~s~s ara~ ~x~era~~s ~€ lakAg~t~€~~a €~a~ ~eha3~ of tkae ciien~,
gf) ~ l~~y~~ shill ra~~ aece~t ~~ ~~~satgo~a fmx x~presea~~i~g a
~lie~a~ ~~or~ Dees o~~ae~ ~~aa~a the c~a~~~ ~s~~ess:
41) fhe ~~~~~~~~gives in~orra~er~ ~oa~sent;
(2) t~ae~e is r~o i~t~r~erenc~ ~v~~k~ ~h~ ia~rvyer"s i~adepe~is~eaace
of p~~fessi~r~~l ~a~~o~n~~~ ~~ va~At~ tla~ c~iez~t-lavry~r
~e~a~ioz~skai~; acid
(3) inf~rrxa~ti~~a r~~at~~ag fo r~p~~sen~atioaa of a cliemt is
protected as r~q~ire~i ley Rule ~.6,
{g) A lavv~~~r ~vfl~o r~preser~trs t~~ ~r rz~c~~e ciiez~~~ shall raot
par~ici~ate an ~akireg ~a-~ agg~ega~e set~lerr~ez~t of the cl~ians of ~r
aga~~st the claem#s, or ~~ a cri~ai~aal ease are aggxegatec~ agreement
~s to ga~iltg~ o~ no90 co~~e~~de~e plus, a~~less eae&~ client gives
imfo~~taed co~ise~at, ia~ a ~rri#a~ag s~~~ed by the clien~a The lawyer's
d~sc~~s~a~e sham graclaac~e t~a~ ex~sferaee and ~aatu~e of all the claims
oa~ pleas anv~lved ar~d ~~ t~a~ paxt~c~~atgo~ of each pers~za i~ the
settl~rrgaezat.
41~) A iawye~ ~~aa~l ~a~t:
419 z~al~~ ~~i ~~ree era# ~r~s~estively limning the
lav~er's lia~fllity to a clg~nt fop a~~~actiee ~aa~less the client
~s irade~ez~de~~ly re~re~engeci ~xa making the agreeaxaent; or
62) settle ~ claim ~r ~ote~tia~ cl~azn for sash liats~l~#y tiv~th
aa~ ~.a~r~g~re~e~ated clie~~ or £o~~aae~ cl~~~at a~r~less ghat person is
advised i~ gating o~ tie e~~sn~ad~g~ity of seeking az~c~ is given
a ~eas~nable op~o~#a~~zty to seep t ae ac~~u~ee of insi~pe~dea~t
legal co~axasel zra c~~n~ect~or~ t~aerevri#1~,
(~9 A ~a~ry~~ shalt' a~~t a~q~~~e a prop~ietaay Ar~~erest gra t~~
c~~se ~~ action og subject ~aat~ea~ ~f ~~#iga#ion tine lawyer is
s~n~uc~in~ foa~ ~ client, excep# tl~~t tie lawyer ntaya
~1~ asc~ua~~ ~ iie~ a~t1~~t~~zed ~,~ ~a~v to s~c~are the layer"s
fee or ~~~~nses; ans~
(2) ~o~a~rac~ ~ritla a cl~~~at #~~ a r~as~a~a~le sor~fi~ageatt fee
Eli d CdVI~ C1S~,
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6~) A ~~v~ryer sd~ail nit ~a~ve se~~al re~ati~~s vvi~~ a e~aent
ixmless a sor~sensaaal sexaaay relatio~asfliip exi.stecl between ~l~ern
~rhe~a ties clflent-lawyer ~elat~onslai~ so a~aenceci.
dk) ~Ihyle davvyers aye as~~ciated ire a fa~~a, a ~ro~ibi~ion i~
flee f~~e~oiz~~ parag~a~~as (~) flar~a~g~ (~) that ap~l~es ~o aaay ores
of ti~em shah ~p~ly to ~fl~ ~# t ae .
Co~a~~~t
~u~i~zess ~'a~c~n~c~ctions beta~~en Cdaent ~~~ Z,r~zvyey
[1] A la~n~yer's legal skill and training, Together with the relationship
of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility
of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or
financial transaction with 1 client, for example, a loan or sales transaction
or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of para-
graph (a) must be met even when t11e tr~nszction is not closely related to
the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will
for a client lea~~ns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and
offers to male a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged
in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example,
the sale of title uzsurance or investment services to existing clients of the
lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing
property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee ar-
rangements bettiveen client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5,
although its regLiirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an in-
terest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property 1s payment
of all or pert of a fee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard
commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products
or servzces that the client generally markets to others, for example, ban~c-
ing ox brokerage services, medical services, prod~lcts manufactured or
distributed by the client, znd utilities' services. Tn such transactions, the
lawyer has zoo advaz-itage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in
paragraph. (a) axe urulecessary and impracticable.
[2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the trinsaction itself be fair to the
client and. that its essential terms be ct~znlntlnicated to the client, in writ-
ing, in ~ manner that can be reasonably understood.. Paragraph (a)(2)
regtures that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of
seeking the advice of independent le a). counsel. It also z~equires that the
client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such ldvice. Paragraph
(a)(3) req~,ures that the lawyer obtain the client's .informed consent, in a
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writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transac-
tion and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss
both the material risks of the proposed transactian, including any risk
presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably
available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent
legal co~~nsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).
[3] The risk to a client is gxeltest when the client expects th.e lawyer
to represent the client in the transaction itself ox whezl the lawyer's fi-
nancial intexest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's repre-
sentltion of the client will be material).y limited by the lawyer's financill
interest in the transaction. Here th.e lawyer's role requires that the law-
yer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but
also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lativyex m~.~st
disclose the risks associated with the layvyer's dua:i role as both legal ad-
viser end participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer
will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the
lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must
obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest
may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the cli-
ent's consenf to the transaction.
[~~ If the client is independently represented in the transaction, para-
graph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) require-
ment for .full discloseire is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the
lawyer involved in the transaction ar by the client's independent counsel.
The fact that the client was independently represented an the transaction
is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reason-
able to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.
Llse of Inf~Ynzrti~r~ IZe~~~e~l to ~e~a^~sent~t~on
[5] Use of informafiion relating to the representation to the disadvan-
tage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) ap-
plies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third
person, silch as another client or business associate of the lawyer. Por ex-
ample, if a laU~yer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop
several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to pL~r-
chase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend
that another client make such ~ purchase. The Rule does not prohibit uses
that do not disadvantage the client. For exlmple, a lawyer who learns a
government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the repre-
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sentation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other
clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or requiredby these RL11es. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3.
Guts to Z,~tzv~ev~s
[6)A lawyer znay accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meetsgeneral standards of fairness. For example, a simple gi£t such as a pres-
ent given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a cli-
ent offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not pro-hibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidableby the client under the doctrine of Luzdue influence, which treats clientgifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about
overreaching a.nd imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a
substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyex's benefit, except
where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal in-
strument such as a will or conveyance, the client should have the de-tached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to thisRule is where the client is a relative of the donee.
[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have thelawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor ofthe client's estate ox to another. potentially lucrative fiduciary position.
Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict
of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that thelawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit thelawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client con-
cerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the cli-
ent's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client
concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the
appointment, as well as the availability of alternitive candidates fox theposition.
~~teY~c~y d~a~ltts
[9] An agreement by ~~hich a lawyer acquires literary or media rights
concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict betweenthe interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Mea.-
strres suif~ble in the representation of the client may detract from thepublication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does
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.;v, aav ~.,~~.
not prohibit ~ lawyer representing a client in a transaction concernin
g lt-
erary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of
 a share
izz ownership in the property, i~ the arrangement conforms to R
ule 1.5
and paragraphs (a) and (i).
~'i~r~aa~~~~ ~~s~st~a~~e
[10] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceed-
ings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guarzn
teeing
loans to their clients for living expenses, bec~~~se to do so woul
d encour-
age clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be broug
ht and
because such assistance gives lacNyers too great a financial stale 
in the
litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer l
end-
ing aclient court costs and litigation expenses, including, the expens
es of
medical examination and the costs of obtaining end presenting ev
idence,
because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from c
ontingent
fees and help ensure access to the coL~rts. Similarly, an exception
 allow-
ing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litig
ation
expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warra
nted.
~~~so~ P~c~~~n~ fc~~ c~ La~zva~e~'~ 5e~^vi~~s
[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent ~ client under circum-
stances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in
 whole
or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemn
itor
(such as a liability insurance company) or ~ co-client (such as a coxpora-
tion sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party
payers frequently have interests thlt differ from those of t11e client, i
n-
cluding interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representati
on
and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyexs ire pro-
hibited from. accepting or continiting such representations Ltnless the la
w-
yer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's ind
e-
pendent professional judgment and there is informed consent fxom the
client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's pro-
fessional judgmeni by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer
to render legal services fox another).
[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient fox the lawyer to obtain the cli-
ent's informed consent regarciir:ig the fact of the payment and the ide
ntity
of the third-party payer. If, however, fhe fee arrangement crepes a con-
flict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with R~rle 1.
7.
The lawyer mLrst also conform to the requirements of R~~le 1.6 concern-
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ing confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there
is sib ficant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be ma-
terially limited by the lawyer's own izlterest in the fee ar~~angement or by
the Lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for e~a.mple, where
the third-party payer is 1 co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may ac-
cept or continue the representation with t11e informed consent of each af-
fected client, Lidless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragr~pll.
Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.
flg~yeg~te Settlements
[13] Di£ferezzces in willingness to make ox accept an offer of settle-
ment are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients
by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should
be discussed before Llndertal<ing the representation, as part of the pro-
cess of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a)
protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to
accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a
guilty or polo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rL11e stated in this
paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any
settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple
clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms
of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if
the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition
of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defen-
dants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer
relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers
must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class mem-
bers ante other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate
protection of the entire class.
Limit%ng Liability cznd Settl%ng l~c~lp~cactiee Clr~~ans
[14] Agreements prospectively limning a lawyex's liability for mal-
practice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in
making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent
and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the
desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen,
particularly if they axe then represented by the lawyer seeking the agree-
ment. This paragraph does not, however; prohibit a Dwyer. from enter-
ing into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims,
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provided such agreements are enforceable and t:he client is fully informed
of the scope and e:Efect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit
the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of alimited-liability entity,
where permitted by law, provided that each Dwyer remains personally
liable to the client for his or her own conduct znd the firm complies with
any conditions required by law, such 1s provisions requiring client notifi-
cation or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit
an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the
representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations
of representation illusory will amount to ~n attempt to limit liability.
[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice
are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that
a lawyer wi11 take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client ox former
client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the ap-
propriateness of independent representation in connection with such a
settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a
reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.
~icqu~ring 1'~opa~ietaYy Interest in Litigcttzon
[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers
are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like
paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty
and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great
an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires
an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more
difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The
Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and
continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs
of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets
forth exceptions for liens aLzthorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees
or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each
jurisdiction determines which liens axe authorized by law. These may in-
clude liens granted by stltute, liens originating in common law and liens
acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract
a sec~.irity interest in property other than that recovered through the law-
yex's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial
transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of para-
graph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by
Rule 1.5.
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client-Lcaz~~ea~ Sexual 1Zel~ttioras~ai~s
[17) The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in
which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence.The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship be-tweerl lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer'sfiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to
use the trust of the client to the clien.t's disadvantage. In addition, such
a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's
emotional involvement, th.e lawyer will be unable to represent the client
without impairment of the exercise o£ uzdependent professional judg-
ment. Moreover, a blixrred line between the professional and personal
relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client con-fidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege,
since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are
.imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the
significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own
emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give ad-
equate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sex-
ual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is con-
sensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.
[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship
are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary rela-tionship and clienf dependency are diminished when the sexual relation-
ship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship.
However, before proceeding with the representation in these circum-
stances, the Dwyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to rep-
resent the client will be materi111y limited by the relationship. See Rule1.7(x)(2).
[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Ruleprohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or out-
side counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the
organization who super. vises, directs or regularly consults with that 11w-yer concerning the organization's legal matters.
Iv~zy~z~t~tion ~f P~~hibitaoazs
[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by 1n individuallawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associ-
ated. in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, onelawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of
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mother member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even
if the £first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the
client. The prohibition set Forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is zlot ap-
plied to associlted lawyers.
~~~~~~~~r~~~ ~~~~~-~~~~~~e~c~~
"Firrri' See Ru.1e 1.0(c)
"Informed consent" See Rule "1.0(e)
"I<nowingl~y" See Rule 1.0(f}
"Substantial" See R~a1e 1.0(1)
"Writing" and "Signed." See Rule 1.0(n)
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6~~ A ~~-r~~e~ vyi~~ ~~s forz~e~~~ ~~:~~~:s~~i~es~ ~ sfie~a~ iz~ a
~a~t~~ s~~l~ ~a~~ ika~r~a~~~e~ ~~~~~.~~r~~ ~r~o~1~~~ ~erso~a i~ the sense
~~ ~ ~~~sfi~~~~~~~~ ue~a~~~~ r~e~~~e~ x~ ~+rla3ci~ f~~ ~ersora's izat~rests
~x~ ~~~:~i~~~y ~~ve~se ~a ~~~ i~a~e~~s~~ o~ ~~ae former cl~~mt u~les~
f~~ fo~~ ~c~~~~~ b~~~s i~~orr~~~ ~~~s~~~, ~o~~ecl ~aa writ~~ag.
4b3 ~ ~~~~~~' ~~~1~ ~~~ ~C~as~~~~~~~ ~e~s~ese~~ a pe~so~a in
 the
s~~a~ ~~ a ~a~~~~~~#~a~~y ~eiafie~ ~f~~~ i~a ~v~s~c~a ~ fir~z vaitk~ vv
hzcfla
#~a~ l~~r;~~~ #~~~rie~~y Baas a~~oega#~d dad pr~v~o~sly ~epr~~ented
~ c1i~~~
~~~ ~~~~ 
~~a~e~~~t~ ~r~ a~~r~~bl~ ~ci~~~se t~ t3aa~ per~o~;
a~a~
~~~ ~~a~a~~ ~~~a~ ~~u~ ~~~~ ~aad ~c~~~~e~ ~~go~~aaa~ion
p~o~eet~~ ~Sy ~a~~~~ 3.,6 a~~ ~.~~~~ ~~~~ ~s a~~~e~~~~ go ~k~e matter;
az~~e~~ ~~e~ ~~~~ ~~ie~~~ ~~~r~~ ~~~~:r~~ ~o~se~~, c~~afir~aaed z~
~~~ A ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~,~,~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~g~~c~~~ ~ c~~~~~ b~ ~ ~aattc
r
o~ ~~~~~ ~~p~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~ ~~ ~~s ~~~e~~y ~~p~es~~afed ~ ~~i~rat
~~ ~ ~~~€~
x s~~a~~ ~n~~ ~~~~~a~t~~e
~~ ~ a~~e n~f+~~~~~~~ r~~~~~~~ ~~ tka~ ~~p~ese~~ata~~ t~
~~~ ~~s~~~r~~fz~~~ a~~ tree f~~aa~~~ ~~~~:x~t ~xc~p# as #~e~~ Ra~les
~vv~~ald p~e~~afl~ ~x r~~~~~~'~ ~r~~ka ~~s~s~~~ ~o ~ si~en~, ox when
~~e ~~~~~a~~~~~~a ~a~~ ~~c~a~~ ~erae~~~1y lc~~~~, o~
~~~ ~~~~~~ a~a~~~~i~arc~~~a ~~l~~a~~ f~ °~~~ ~~prese~n~at~o~
g;s~~~s~ ~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~a~~a~~ p~r~a~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~ v~r~~~
re~~~~~ ts~ ~ ~~x~~~,
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CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP Rule 1.9
[1] After termination of a cliezZt-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has
certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of
interest and thus may not represent anotlZer diezzt except in conformity
with this Rule. Undex this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly
seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of
the former client. So also a Izwyer who has prosecuted an accused per-
son could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action
against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a
lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of
the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter
after a dispixte arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected
clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former gov-
ernment lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by
Rixle 1.11.
[2] The scope of a "ma.tter" for purposes of this Rule depends on the
facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement
in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been
directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of
other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly
is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a
type of problem for a former client is not precluded. from later represent-
ing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though
the subsequent re~resent~tion involves a position adverse to the prior
client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military
lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same mil-
itary jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so
involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be jixstly
regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in gLrestion.
[3] Matters axe "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if
they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is
a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally
have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance
the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who
has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private finan-
cial information about that person may not then represent that persozl's
spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously rep-
resented aclient in securing environmental permits to build a shopping
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center would be precluded from. representing neighbors seeking to op-
pose rezoning of the property on t11e basis of environmental consid.er-
ations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of
sLibstantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shop-
ping center. in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that
has been disclosed to ~lze public or to other parties advexse to t11e forz~er
client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in ~ prior
representation may have been rezldered obsolete by the passage of time,
a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two repre-
sent~tions are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client,
general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will
not precl~ide a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge
of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the
matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A for-
mer client is not required to reveal t11e confidential information learned
by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has
confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion
about the possession o£ such information may be based on the nature
of. the services the lawyer provided the foxmer client and information
that would in ordinary practice be learned by a J.awyer providing such
services.
L,c~wyeYs Moving Between FiYsns
[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end
their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake rep-
resentation is more complicated. There are several competing consider-
ations. First, the client previoti~sly represented by the fornner firm must be
reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not com-
promised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude
other pexsons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the
rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new asso-
ciations and taking on new clients after having left a previous associa-
tion. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers
practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to
one field or another, and that many move from one association to another
several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied
with t~nc~ualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the op-
portunity of l~wye~~s to move from one practice setting to another and of
the opportunity of clients to change counsel.
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p- [5] Paragraph (U) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the
'r- lawyex involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules
of 1..6 Ind 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowl-
p- edge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that
at lawyer later joined another firm, neither t].Ze lawyer individually nor the
'r second firm is disqualified from representing another client izz the same
~r or a related matter even though the interests ~f the two clients conflict.
e, See Rule L10(b) for the restrictions on z firm once a lawyer has termi-
'- Hated association with the firm.
t, [6] Application of plragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular
11 facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that re1-
e sonably may be made about the way in which lawyez•s work together. A
e lawyer may hive general access to files of X11 clients of a law £irm and
- may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be in-
~ fermd that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the
s firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of
1 only a limited mtmber of clients and participate in discussions of the af-
fairs of no other clients; izz the absence of information to the contrary, it
1 should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about
t the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an in-
qui.ry, the burden of proof should rest Upon the firm whose disqu~lifica-
tion issought.
[7] Independent of the question of disgir~lification of a firm, a lawyer
changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve con-
fidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules
1.6 and 1.9(c}.
[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer
in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or re-
vea]ed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact
that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from
using generally known information about that client when later repre-
senting another client.
[9) The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients
and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent
must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule
1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Com-
ment [22] to R~.ile 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which
a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.
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~e~~i~~~~~~ ~~~s~~Refe~e~ses
"Confirmed in writing" See Rule 1.0(b)
"Firm" See Rule 1.0(c)
"Informed Consent" See Rule 1.0(e)
"Knowingly" and "Known" See Rule 1.0(f)
"Writing" See Rule 1.0(n)
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~o~r~~Ic~~ ~~ ~~t~~~~s~o ~~~r~~~~ It~~~
~a)'~k~~l~ lawyers aye a~~oci~ted in a firma, aa~ne ~f ~herrr~ hail
k~aowyx~gly ~e~~eserat a client vvla~~a a~a~ or e ~f t~e~xa ~raet3c~~g
aloe ~+ro~ld be ~ro&~~~itecl from ~~a~ag so ~y I~~~es 1.7 or 1.9, ~n~~ss
4~) ~h~ ~xo~aibi#ion ~s based ~ri ~ ~~rs~rcal ia~fe~est ~~ the
~~sq~aali~iec~ lawyer anti saes a~ot present a sigza~ficant risk
~£ rna#e~ia~l~ li~aaiting the re~sresenta#aon o~ fie cii~ra~ ~y #ire
rexnai~ing lawyers i~ the ~z~a~; ox
42) the }~~olai~iitxo~a ~s d~asec~ ~g~oa~ I~~1~ 1.94a) og (b), axed
erases oaf o~ t&ae ~~~quali~ed la~vy~x~'s associa~ioa~ v+aifl~ a prior
f~ra~c, ~n~
(~9 tie c~isq~aalx~i~cl la~ye~ is ti~e~y screened fxom arty
pa~~~c~~ati~~a ia~ t ae matter a~ad is a~pot~~on~c~ rao part o~
t ae fee t~aerefroa~,
{a~) w~it~en notiee is p~oan~tiy given to aa~y affected
f~r~r'er cliemt t~ enable flee fo~rr~er e~zent #o ascerta~~
coraa~l~a~ce vv~t~a the ~xovisiox~s of #his Rule, vrlaacla
s~aall ia~cl~sle a descriptz~r~ ~f tie screening ~r~cectures
employed; a sfrate end of the firm°s and of the screened
iawye~'s corn~lianc~ Sri#h the~~ Ig~ales; a statement
that ~e~r~e~ maybe avaiY~~le ~ef~re a t~aba~~al; aid a~
agree eat by tine firma fo a~es~sond ~ro~ti~#ly to any v~rrittea~
~~q~x~ies ~a~ c~bjectz~~~ ~~ the for ~~ cl~ea~t abot~~ tk~e
screexay~ag procec~~z~~s; ane~
(iai9 ce~t~fica~ioza~ ~f c~s~~la~~~~ ~n~a~~a ~l~~se IZ~les ar~c~
wv~~~a flee screea~~~g ~roceda~~es a~~ ~r~vides~ f~ t4~e ~o~er
e~~eraf ~y t ae scxee~ed latex ~n~l by ~ partner o$ t ae firrxa,
at ~easo~aable iratea~al~ aap~a~ tie forrne~ client's vvxatten
resj~est amp ~apor~ teraninatioxa of the screerai~~ prace~-ur~se
~'~) ~T~e~ a l~~ry~r has fex~aan~tecl ~~a a~so~iatio~t vvikh a firrgt,
#tae a5a ~s ~s~t ~rol~zbite~ fx~srr~ t erea#tee ~e~~ese~ti~~ a ~e~~~~
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with interests materially adverse to those of a client represez~tecl
by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented
by the firm, unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in
which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information
protected by Rules 1.6 and 19(c) that is material to the matter.
(c) !~ disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived
by the affected client under the conditions stated in 12u1e 71.7.
(d) The disqualification of lawyers a~sociatesl in a firm with
former or cixxrent government lawyers is governed by 12u1e 1.11.
Co rnet
17efinition of "Firm"
[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term
"firm" denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation,
sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or
lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal depart-
ment of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(c). Whether two
or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on
the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2]—[4].
Pri~tciples of Ianputed I~isquRlificRtion
[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stafed in paragraph (a) gives
effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who
pxactice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered £rom the premise
that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules
governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is
vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with
whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a)(1) operates only among the
lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one
£irm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(a)(2)
and 1.10(b).
[3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where
neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential informa-
tion are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could. not effectively rep-
resent a give~z client because of strong political beliefs, fox example, but
that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the
lawyer will not materially limit the representltion by others in the firm,
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the firm should not be c~i.squalified. On the other. hlncl, if an opposing
party in a case were owzled by a lawyer in t11e law £irm, anc~ others in the
firm would be materially lim:i~ed in pursuing the matter because of loy-
alty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer wotiild be
imputed to all o~rhers in the firm.
[4] The r~.~le in paragraph (~) also does not prohibit representation by
others i.n the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in
a mattex is a rlonlawyer, such as z plralegal ox legal secretary. Nor does
paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the llwyer is prohibited from act-
in~ because o:E events before t11e person became a lawyer, for example,
work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, or-
dinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter
to avoid comm~.uzication to others in the firm. of confidential information
that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See
Rules 1.0(1<) and 5.3.
[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, antler certlin circum-
stazlces, to represeT.zt a person with interests directly adverse to those of a
client represented by a lawyer wlzo formerly was associated with the firm.
The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer repre-
sented the client. However, the law firm m1y not represent a person with
interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which wot~id vio-
late Rile 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the
matter is the same or substantially related Eo that in which the formerly
associated Iawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently
in the firm h.as material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).
[6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the
affected client or former client Linder fhe conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The
conditiozls stated in Rule 1.7 require the lzwyer to determine that the rep-
resentation is not prohibited by R~,ile 1..7(b) and that each affected client or
former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed
in writing. In. some uses, the risk may be so severe thlt the conflict may
not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of cli-
ent waivers of. conflicts that might arise in ~h.e future, see Rule 1.7, Com-
me7zt [22]. Por a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(e).
[7] Rule 1.~10(a)(2) similarly removes the imputation otherwise re-
quired by Rule 1.10(x), but unlike section (c), it does so withoL~t requiring
that there be informed consent by the former client. Instead, it requires
that the procedures laid out in sections (a)(2)(i)-(iii) be followed. A de-
scription of. effective screening mechanisms appears in Rule 1.0(k). Law-
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yers should be aware, however, that, even where screening mechanisms
have been adopted, tribunals may consider additional factors in ruling
upon motions to disglxalify a lawyer from pending litigation.
[8] Paragraph (a)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from
receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent
agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly re-lated to the matter in which t11e lawyer is disqualified.
[9) The notice required by paragrlph (a)(2)(ii) generally should in-
clude adescription of the screened lawyer's prior representation and be
given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes appar-
ent. It also should include a statement by the screened lawyer and thefirm that the client's materiel confidential information has not been dis-
closed or used in violation of the Rules. The notice is intended to enable
the former client to evaluate and comment upon the effectiveness of the
screening procedures.
[10] The certifications required by paragraph (a)(2)(iii) give the for-
mer client assurance that the client's material confidential informationhas not been disclosed or used inappropriately, either prior to timely im-
plementation of a screen or thereafter. If compliance cannot be certified,
the certificate must describe the failure to comply.
[11) Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having repre-
sented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b) and (c),
not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the govern-
ment after. having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental
employment or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are
not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually dis-
qualified lawyer.
[12] Where a lawyer i.s prohibited fxom engaging in certain transac-
tions Lender Rule 1.8, paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, deter-
mizles whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associatedin a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.
Definitgonal Cross-References
"Firm" See Rule 1.0(c)
"Knowingly" See Rule 1.0(f)
"Partner" See Rule 1.0(g)
"Screened" See Rule 1.0(k)
"Tribunal" See Rule 1.0(m)
"Written" See Rule 1.0(n)
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